This paper investigates whether managers use the deferred tax asset valuation allowance account (VAA) to manage earnings around three earnings targets: positive net income, historical annual earnings, and the mean analyst forecast. While early studies using broad samples find little evidence of earnings management via the VAA, recent studies using narrowly defined samples conclude that certain firms use the VAA to manage earnings around these three earnings targets.
Introduction
This paper offers comprehensive evidence of earnings management via the deferred tax asset valuation allowance account (VAA) and bridges the gap between earlier studies that do not find evidence of earnings management via the VAA using broad samples and more recent studies that find such evidence using unique settings. Bridging this gap is important because the appropriate amount of discretion to give managers is a central question to accounting regulators (Healy and Wahlen 1999) . With this comprehensive evidence, standard setters can better assess the response to allowing discretion in Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), which are applicable to a diverse group of firms.
One benefit of discretion in GAAP is that managers can convey their private information to financial statement users. However, discretion also allows managers to manipulate earnings in order to increase their personal wealth. The VAA is an important accrual through which to examine the use of managerial discretion because the benefits and costs of discretion have been at the heart of the controversy surrounding the VAA since the issuance of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 109 in 1992. Critics of SFAS No. 109 contend the criteria established for determining the VAA provides managers with substantial discretion and creates a likely earnings management tool. The earnings management tool arises because managers can increase the VAA in "good earnings" years to build a reserve that can be used in "bad earnings" years to inflate earnings. 1 Generally, increases (decreases) in the VAA increase (decrease) deferred tax expense, and therefore decrease (increase) earnings. 2 Proponents of SFAS No. 109 argue that the discretion allows managers to report a more accurate value of deferred tax assets based on their private information. 3 Under SFAS No. 109, the net deferred tax liability reported on the balance sheet consists of three components: gross deferred tax liabilities (GDTL), gross deferred tax assets (GDTA) and the VAA. Gross deferred tax liabilities measure the taxes due on future taxable amounts while gross deferred tax assets measure the tax benefits from future deductible amounts. The VAA reduces the value of gross deferred tax assets to the extent managers believe that the future tax benefits are "more likely than not" to not be realized.
SFAS No. 109 recognizes four sources of taxable income that managers can use to determine the realizability of a gross deferred tax asset and therefore the size of the VAA: 1) future reversals of deferred tax liabilities, 2) taxable income in prior carryback years, 3) tax planning strategies, and 4) expected future taxable income. These specific criteria allow researchers to model the nondiscretionary behavior of the VAA. The application of specific criteria in accounting usually entails the loss of managerial discretion and restricts earnings management behavior. In contrast, the application of specific criteria in SFAS No. 109 still allows substantial managerial discretion in setting the VAA because of the subjective nature of determining whether deferred tax assets are "more likely than not" to not be realized. This combination of specific criteria and substantial managerial discretion make the VAA a useful account to study earnings management behavior relative to aggregate or other specific accruals.
Substantial prior research examines the behavior of aggregate accruals and concludes that firms manage earnings through aggressive accrual accounting. However, other studies argue that the empirical methods used in aggregate accrual research can lead to misleading inferences because the models employed do not adequately capture nondiscretionary behavior. 4 To address this concern, McNichols (2000) calls for more earnings management research based on specific accruals. Prior research that examines managerial discretion over specific accruals focuses on relatively homogeneous firms by investigating unique settings or particular industries. 5 While these studies provide powerful settings that document evidence consistent with earnings management behavior, their results may not generalize to the wider population of firms that are of interest to standard setters. The discretion allowed in determining the VAA is an earnings management tool that is available to any firm with a gross deferred tax asset. The VAA is a specific accrual with well-defined nondiscretionary behavior and widespread availability that is subject to substantial managerial discretion. These three factors make examining the VAA an important contribution to standard setters' understanding of managers' use of discretion in GAAP.
The earliest papers investigating earnings management via the VAA examine heterogeneous We use the residual from the first stage regression as our measure of the unexpected change in VAA (i.e., discretionary portion of the VAA). In the second stage, we regress the unexpected change in VAA on our proxies for incentives to manage earnings around three earnings targets.
While there can be many motivations to manage earnings, we focus on three annual earnings targets that affect a large segment of the capital market and are widely cited in prior research and the popular press: to report a positive profit, to meet last year's (historical) earnings, and to meet the mean analyst forecast. 7 Because we retain firm-years without regard to their proximity to an earnings target, we can evaluate the frequency of earnings management via the VAA for a large segment of the market value captured by Compustat. DeGeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) and
Brown and Caylor (2003) examine the conditional frequencies of these three earnings targets.
DeGeorge et al. find evidence consistent with positive net income being the most important target, followed by historical annual earnings and the mean analyst forecast. However, Brown and Caylor find evidence that the hierarchy of these three earnings targets has changed over time. In particular, they find the mean analyst forecast is the most important target during our sample period (1994 -2001) . In light of this research on the relative importance of the three earnings targets, we examine the conditional frequencies and marginal effect of each target on the managed portion of the VAA.
Our results reveal that managers use the VAA to manage income up and smooth earnings down toward the mean analyst earnings forecast. In univariate analysis, we document that firmyears with premanaged earnings below an earnings target use the VAA to meet the mean analyst forecast more frequently than they use the VAA to meet the other two earnings targets. In multivariate analysis, we find that earnings management via the VAA around the mean analyst forecast is robust across industries and years. We also find limited evidence that firms in certain industries use the VAA to take an "earnings bath" when premanaged earnings are far below zero.
However, we find no evidence that firms use the VAA to manage income around historical annual earnings. Finally, we document that premanaged earnings are closer to the mean analyst forecast than the other two earnings targets, making the mean analyst forecast an "easier" target to reach. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our research design and hypotheses.
Section 3 presents the empirical results, and Section 4 concludes.
Research Design and Hypotheses Development
Similar to McNichols and Wilson (1988) , Jones (1991), and Beaver and Engel (1996), our research design consists of two stages. First, we model the expected change in the VAA as a function of specific criteria established in SFAS No. 109. Second, we use the residual from the first-stage regression as our proxy for the unexpected change in the VAA. We then regress the unexpected change in VAA on incentives to manage earnings around three earnings targets.
First Stage Regression
We model the expected change in VAA following SFAS No. 109 in order to derive a proxy for the unexpected change in the VAA. Using pooled OLS regressions for each one-digit SIC code,
we estimate the expected change in VAA. 8 We use the residuals from the first-stage regressions as our measure of unexpected change in VAA (U∆VAA): 109 states that a firm's strong earnings history and appreciation in the value of its net assets over the tax bases are evidence that a firm does not need a VAA. Therefore, we include average historical earnings (HROA) as a proxy for a firm's earnings history and change in the market-to-book ratio (∆MTB) as a proxy for the change in the value of a firm's net assets. As these measures increase,
we expect firms to decrease their VAA (β 8 < 0, β 9 < 0). We calculate ∆HROA, ∆ROA, FROA, and HROA using pretax income to avoid including the effect of changes in VAA.
Finally, we include ASSETS (total assets) to control for scale effects that may be driven by the size of the firm, and YEAR and FIRM to control for year and firm fixed-effects. We do not have directional predictions for the coefficients on ASSETS, YEAR, or FIRM.
Second Stage Regression
With the residuals from equation (1) as our proxy for U∆VAA, we estimate the following equation to test for VAA-related earnings management behavior:
where: PMNI<<T = a dummy variable equal to 1 if premanaged earnings are less than -0.10; zero otherwise, where premanaged earnings are reported net income in year t (annual Compustat item #172) plus U∆VAA t , scaled by MVE t-1 , PM∆NI<<T = a dummy variable equal to 1 if the premanaged change in net income is less than -0.10; zero otherwise, where premanaged change in net income is reported net income in year t plus U∆VAA t , less reported net income in year t-1, scaled by MVE t-2 , PMAFE<<T = a dummy variable equal to 1 if premanaged analyst forecast error is less than -0.10; zero otherwise, where premanaged analyst forecast error is net income for year t as reported on I/B/E/S, plus U∆VAA t scaled by common shares outstanding in year t, less the mean analyst forecast for year t as reported on I/B/E/S, We estimate equation (2) by one-digit SIC code in order to compare our results to Schrand and Wong (2003) , which finds evidence of earnings management via the VAA by commercial banks.
We also estimate equation (2) Following Healy (1985) , we test for three types of earnings management behavior around our three earnings targets: 1) income-increasing earnings management to 'meet the target, ' 2) income-decreasing earnings management to build 'cookie jar reserves,' and 3) income-decreasing earnings management to take an 'earnings bath.' 13 Healy (1985) proposes that firms will engage in income-increasing accruals when an earnings target can be met through accrual management (i.e., to 'meet the target') and in income-decreasing accruals when a threshold cannot be met through income-increasing accruals (i.e., to take an 'earnings bath') or when premanaged income substantially exceeds a threshold (i.e., to build 'cookie jar reserves').
14 If a firm uses the VAA to increase income in order to meet an earnings target, then we hypothesize that the firm will report a less positive change in its VAA than it otherwise would have. If a firm uses the VAA to build cookie jar reserves or to take an earnings bath, then we hypothesize that the firm will report a more positive change in its VAA than it otherwise would have.
The earnings management indicator variables in equation (2) . We predict that firms with premanaged earnings just below an earnings target (PMNI<T = 1, PM∆NI<T = 1, PMAFE<T = 1) will reduce the VAA to increase their reported earnings to meet the target (β 4 , β 5 , β 6 < 0). Finally, we predict that firms with premanaged earnings sufficiently above an earnings target (PMNI>T = 1, PM∆NI>T = 1, PMAFE>T = 1) will increase the VAA to build cookie jar reserves (β 7 , β 8 , β 9 > 0). 15 We measure premanaged earnings as reported earnings plus our measure of unexpected change in the VAA. 
Empirical Results

Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Given that VAA data must be hand-collected, we limit the sample to U.S. publicly-traded firms with calendar year-ends and positive book values that are reported on the 2002 Compustat tapes. To further simplify data collection and to build a panel data set, we also require firms to have net income on Compustat and analysts' forecasts on I/B/E/S from 1993-2001. 17 With these initial firm-years, we collect deferred tax information from income tax footnotes. If a firm-year is missing the VAA, deferred tax asset, or deferred tax liability data, we delete the firm-year from our sample leaving 4,569 firm-years (640 firms). 18 Finally, we winsorize the variables in equation (1) 19 We expect our sample to include larger, older, and more profitable firms because of the consecutive years and analysts' forecast data requirements. Consistent with this expectation, the mean and median size and profitability variables are significantly larger for our sample than for the Compustat population. While our sample has mean and median market-to-book ratios similar to those of the Compustat population, the mean and median price-to-earnings ratios for our sample are substantially higher than those ratios for the Compustat population. When comparing the average price-to-earnings and profitability variables from our sample to the Compustat population, the differences are much larger than differences between the median priceto-earnings and profitability variables. The large average differences appear to be due to substantial negative earnings reported by the Compustat population over the sample period. This result is consistent with the Compustat population including more small companies with weak earnings histories that went public during the "internet boom" of the 1990s. Our sample of larger and older firms may limit our ability to generalize the results to smaller or younger firms; however, the sample represents a diverse group of firms that comprise a large segment of the Compustat population during this period. Therefore, our results encompass a significant portion of publiclytraded equity. insignificantly different from zero. Because of our data requirements, the average sample firm is much larger than the median firm. Table 3 presents results from the first-stage regressions of ∆VAA on factors expected to affect the VAA, as specified in SFAS No. 109. We use the residuals from these regressions as our measure of the unexpected change in VAA (U∆VAA). We estimate the regression for each onedigit SIC code. We do not estimate regressions for SIC codes 0 or 9 because we have less than thirty firm-years for each of these subsamples.
First Stage Regression
The results in Table 3 show that our model accounts for a significant portion of the variation in ∆VAA, with adjusted R 2 s ranging from 67.93 to 29.10 percent across industries. 20 The table also also fluctuate across industries. ∆ROA has the most consistent coefficients with three out of eight coefficients (SIC 1, 2, and 3) significantly negative. 21 Overall, the results in Table 3 indicate that firms consider some of the factors specified by SFAS No. 109 when setting the VAA and the importance of the factors depends on the industry. While prior research uses different samples and research designs, our conclusions are similar. In particular, we conclude that deferred tax assets, especially those related to NOL carryforwards, are the most important nondiscretionary component of the change in the VAA.
Using the residuals from the regressions in Table 3 as our proxy for U∆VAA, we compute premanaged earnings (i.e., earnings prior to the unexpected change in VAA). Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for U∆VAA. The average (median) firm's discretionary behavior decreases (increases) its VAA by just $15,000 ($59,000). However, the 25 th and 75 th percentiles show that at least 50 percent of our firm-years exhibit at least $3 million of discretionary changes in the VAA.
We also scale U∆VAA by the absolute value of reported earnings and find the average firm's discretionary change in VAA is 6 percent of reported earnings. The negative sign suggests that the average discretionary change increases reported earnings. In Table 2 , we also report the differences between premanaged earnings and the three earnings targets (PMNI, PM∆NI, PMAFE). The median firm has premanaged earnings that beats all three earnings targets, while the average firm beats the zero and historical annual earnings targets. Finally, most of our sample has positive premanaged earnings, which suggests that managing the VAA to report positive net income is not a concern for most of the sample.
Frequency Analysis of U∆VAA
To get a better understanding of the influence of U∆VAA on reported earnings, we also compute the frequencies of firm-years with premanaged earnings: (1) far below, (2) just below, (3) just above, and (4) sufficiently above the three earnings targets, and compare these frequencies to the frequencies for firm-years with reported earnings: (1) far below, (2) 
Second Stage Regressions
The results in Table 4 suggest substantial use of the VAA to manage earnings around the mean analyst forecast. However, the frequency analysis in Table 4 only reflects earnings management around one target at a time. Therefore, we estimate our second stage regressions (equation (2)) to control for any correlation between the targets. 23 Table 5 reports the results from estimating equation (2) for each one-digit SIC code. Consistent with the univariate analysis reported in Table 4 , the multivariate analysis in Table 5 indicates that firms primarily use their discretion in SFAS No. 109 to manage earnings via the VAA around the mean analyst forecast.
Contrary to the earnings bath hypothesis, we find that firms with premanaged earnings far below the mean analyst forecast reduce their VAA to report higher net income. The coefficient on PMAFE<<T is negative across all 8 one-digit SIC industries and is significantly negative for seven of the eight. This result is consistent with prior academic research that provides little evidence that firms take earnings baths around the mean analyst forecast. Schrand and Wong find evidence consistent with commercial banks managing the VAA to smooth earnings toward both targets. Table 5 reports similar evidence for firms-years in the financial services industry (i.e., SIC = 6000). The only difference is that our negative coefficients on PM∆NI<<T and PM∆NI<T, while the same sign, are not significant. 25 In summary, the evidence in Table 5 suggests that firms in all industries frequently use the VAA to manage earnings up and smooth earnings down toward the mean analyst forecast. However, we find little evidence that firms use the VAA to manage earnings around the positive and historical earnings targets. 26 We also estimate equation (2) using annual cross-sectional regressions for 1994 -2001 to compare our results to earlier papers that investigate the initial years in our sample. 27 The inferences from these untabulated results are similar to those in Table 5 To investigate these contracting incentives to manage earnings, we include a proxy for debt covenants in equation (2) . Similar to prior research, we found no consistent evidence of earnings management with respect to this contracting incentive (results untabulated).
28 Table 5 provides evidence that firms use the VAA to manage earnings toward the mean analyst forecast, while controlling for incentives to manage earnings toward the positive and historical earnings targets. However, Table 5 does not examine whether firms actually meet the mean analyst forecast using the discretion in the VAA. Table 6 presents the frequencies of 'crossovers' (i.e., the number of firm-years that meet or beat an earnings target due to the unexpected change in VAA). Specifically, these firm-years have premanaged earnings below an earnings target and reported earnings above an earnings target. The variable, 'Mean Distance', measures the average distance between premanaged earnings and the earnings target on a per share basis. 29 The first line of Table 6 target. These results suggest that meeting the mean analyst forecast with premanaged earnings is more difficult than meeting the other two earnings targets. While far more firm-years miss the mean analyst forecast with premanaged earnings compared to the other earnings targets, firms also appear to use the VAA more frequently to meet the mean analyst forecast. In particular, 47 percent of the 959 firm-years that miss the mean analyst forecast with premanaged earnings are able to meet the target using the VAA (i.e., the crossover firm-years). The 47 percent crossover statistic is in stark contrast to the less than 5 percent crossover rate for the other two earnings targets. One explanation for the difference is the substantially smaller 'Mean Distance' firms need to manage to reach the mean analyst forecast target. Specifically, the average Mean Distance for those firms that miss the mean analyst forecast is only 13 cents compared to the 55 and 90 cents mean distances for the positive and historical earnings targets, respectively. The non-crossover firm-years also indicate that the distance between premanaged earnings and the earnings target is an important factor in determining whether a manager will use the VAA to meet that earnings target. That is, noncrossovers firm-years have larger Mean Distances relative to crossover firm-years for each target. firm-years that meet historical earnings, the Mean Distance is comparable to the 293 firm-years that meet the mean analyst forecast. Again, the non-crossover firm-years indicate that the distance between premanaged earnings and the earnings target is an important factor in determining whether a manager will use the VAA to meet an earnings target.
Finally, 343 firm-years (7.5%) have premanaged earnings that miss all three earnings targets. Similar to the other crossover analyses, substantially more firms-years crossover the mean analyst forecast target using the VAA than the other two targets and the distance between premanaged earnings and the earnings target is an important factor. These univariate crossover results reinforce the multivariate results in Table 5 .
Conclusions
The first studies to examine earnings management via the VAA do not find evidence that a in the recent studies create more powerful settings, the research designs also limit the use of the evidence for standard setters. GAAP provides guidance for a diverse set of firms and standard setters need to understand how discretion is used by a broad set of the population.
This paper bridges the gap between the early and recent studies by providing evidence that firms across industries and time use the discretion in the VAA to manage earnings around the mean analyst forecast. Early studies that do not find evidence of earnings management using a heterogeneous sample of firms appear to be limited by the contracting incentives that they examine.
More recent evidence of earnings management around positive profits and historical annual earnings appears limited to unique settings. Overall, this paper advances accounting research on whether managers follow SFAS No. 109 in setting the VAA and whether they take advantage of the discretion allowed under SFAS No. 109 to manage earnings.
This paper also contributes to the growing earnings management literature. Following suggestions from McNichols (2000), we take a "specific accrual approach" and focus on the VAA to determine how managers meet three commonly-cited earnings targets. In particular, we document the frequency with which a broad cross-section of the Compustat population achieves positive profits, historical, and mean analyst forecast earnings targets by managing the VAA.
Consistent with Brown and Caylor (2003), we find that earnings management to meet the mean analyst forecast dominates the other targets. In addition, we find that the distance between the mean analyst forecast and premanaged earnings is smaller than the distance between the other earnings targets and premanaged earnings. This result supports evidence in the accounting literature that firms manage analysts' forecasts while the other targets are fixed. Finally, we also find firms that meet an earnings target through changes in the VAA (i.e., crossover firms) have a smaller distance between premanaged earnings and the earnings target than firms that fail to meet the target (i.e., noncrossover firms). Therefore, we conclude managers' use of accounting discretion depends on their ability to reach an earnings target through both income and target management. Valuation allowance account at year t for firm i.
Explanatory Variables for the First Stage Regressions:
∆NOLDTA it = Change in gross deferred tax assets arising from net operating losses from year t-1 to t for firm i.
Change in gross deferred tax assets arising from sources other than net operating losses from year t-1 to t for firm i.
Change in the gross deferred tax liabilities from year t-1 to t for firm i. 
